Venezuela Debt Restructuring: Status, Claims & Timeline
A live tracker from the Venezuela Restructuring Desk · Last updated: October 13, 2026
What is the current status of Venezuela's debt restructuring?
As of 13 October 2026, creditors are organising, but a sovereign exchange has not been proposed and there is no authorised debt negotiation. GL 58 reaches Day 161: it permits preparatory advisory work, not negotiations by the Republic's advisers with creditors. No additional negotiation or execution authorisation has been reported in the desk's latest briefing. The political dialogue in Caracas is a separate process, not a bondholder negotiating table.
El Nacional reported on 7 October that official calculations put gross debt near USD 238 billion, close to the Financial Times' June estimate of USD 240 billion. Economist Alejandro Grisanti estimates that about USD 40 billion is owed among Venezuelan public entities. The government's financial adviser is expected to present a reference document of fiscal, financial and real-sector figures, but the document, its recipients and a firm publication date remain unreported. The debt sustainability analysis promised in June is still unpublished.
Bloomberg reported on 9 October that an ad hoc bondholder group including GMO and T. Rowe Price holds at least USD 22 billion in face value, about 37 percent of outstanding bonds, and expects to reach 40 percent within weeks. The IMF's October World Economic Outlook now projects growth of 5 percent in 2026 and 7 percent in 2027. These are macroeconomic forecasts, not an IMF-owned sustainability analysis or a financing programme.
Current status: Preparatory work, no authorised debt negotiation or exchange. US views on the requested CITGO appeal abeyance are due today, 13 October; no filing had been reported at the latest briefing's Tuesday check. GL 60 expires on 23 October, and GL 5Z defers the PDVSA 2020 collateral authorisation to 5 November.
How much does Venezuela owe, and to whom?
The latest reported official gross perimeter is roughly USD 238 billion (El Nacional, 7 October). Grisanti's estimate of about USD 40 billion in intra-public-sector claims would imply about USD 198 billion after simple subtraction (desk arithmetic), not a verified consolidated external debt total. Entity coverage, accrued interest and overlaps must be reconciled before either number can anchor an offer.
The component estimates below remain indicative. They are not an additive audited breakdown of the new headline figure, and intra-public-sector liabilities must not be counted again as a separate external creditor class.
Venezuela debt perimeter, by component
Reported gross perimeter and indicative claim estimates, US$ billion
Top bar is the gross perimeter reported by El Nacional on 7 October. Component bars are indicative desk estimates and may overlap. They do not constitute a reconciliation; about USD 40bn of intra-public-sector claims is an economist's estimate, not an audited adjustment.
| Claim class | Est. amount | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Gross perimeter (reported official calculation) | ~$238bn | El Nacional, Oct 7; underlying reference document not yet published |
| Intra-public-sector claims (within gross total) | ~$40bn | Grisanti estimate; consolidation and overlaps unverified |
| Republic & PDVSA bond principal | ~$60bn | In default since 2017 |
| Post-default interest | ~$40bn | Accruing ~$5bn/year |
| Oil companies & trade creditors | $30-50bn | Unpaid |
| Expropriation / arbitration awards | >$20bn | Included in estimates; CITGO-contesting claims overlap |
| Bilateral - China | $10-20bn | Opaque; partially oil-backed |
| Bilateral - Russia | ~$6bn | Opaque |
| Development banks | ~$4bn | Includes IDB arrears of about $2.19bn at end-2025; proposed refinancing unconfirmed |
Within the arbitration total, the two awards first in the Delaware priority line are ConocoPhillips (~$1.3bn of a larger $8.5bn+ award attached) and Crystallex ($1.0bn). Figures aggregated from the Financial Times, OMFIF, ICSID, Delaware court filings, S&P Global, and market sources.
The CITGO auction, explained
The Delaware court-mandated sale of CITGO's parent, PDV Holding, remains central to creditor enforcement. The tracker carries a USD 5.9 billion Amber Energy sale order; the latest briefing puts the provision for PDVSA 2020 holders at USD 2.125 billion. Amber is an Elliott affiliate. Gold Reserve is a competing, unsuccessful bidder, not a joint buyer alongside Amber.
Venezuela and PDVSA have asked the Third Circuit to hold the appeal in abeyance while they pursue repayment of the Delaware creditors, with status reports every six months. Gold Reserve supports a limited six-month abeyance conditional on concurrent US support. Amber, Crystallex, ConocoPhillips, Tidewater and the Koch entities were among those opposing the request on 8 October, according to Mealey's as carried in the latest briefing.
The court requested the United States' views and interests by 13 October. No US filing had been reported at the latest briefing's Tuesday check; the requested abeyance is not a granted stay. Sale completion remains contingent on OFAC authorisation. Separately, GL 5Z, issued 16 September, defers the PDVSA 2020 collateral authorisation to 5 November 2026. That date is not an automatic auction closing date.
Venezuelan bonds and live pricing
Defaulted Republic and PDVSA bonds account for roughly USD 60 billion in principal, separate from accumulated unpaid interest. A traded price, a legal claim and a modelled recovery are different measures; none is a published restructuring offer.
Contact your relationship manager for live pricing.
Instrument details are available on the Bonds page.
Who are the key players?
Government side. Interim President Delcy Rodríguez and PDVSA are the debtors. Centerview Partners is the retained financial adviser. Its reference document and sustainability analysis remain unpublished. US recognition of the interim president does not itself settle the domestic authority to bind the state to a debt exchange; no sovereign-side debt authority or creditor engagement framework has been reported.
Bondholders. The Venezuela Creditor Committee is advised by Houlihan Lokey, with Orrick as counsel. Separately, Bloomberg's 9 October report names GMO and T. Rowe Price in an ad hoc group holding at least USD 22 billion, about 37 percent of outstanding bonds. The report names no advisers, gives no sovereign/PDVSA or series-level split and does not establish whether this is the same committee. The USD 21.3 billion claims stack under the Netburn suspension must not be treated as interchangeable with this face-value holding figure.
Enforcement creditors and buyer. Amber Energy is the CITGO buyer; Crystallex, ConocoPhillips, Tidewater and the Koch entities are among those opposing an appeal abeyance. Gold Reserve conditionally supports a limited delay. Their recovery routes and positions are not identical to those of unsecured bondholders.
United States. Treasury/OFAC controls transaction authorisations. The Secretary of State said on 23 September that Washington wants to help with a restructuring done in the right way, without announcing a mechanism or timetable. Its requested views in the CITGO appeal are due 13 October.
IMF and IDB. The IMF publishes forecasts and is considering a local technical-cooperation presence; it said on 1 October that no financing had been requested. No Article IV consultation has occurred since 2004. The IDB reopened its Caracas office on 2 October. Reuters' proposed USD 2.5 billion IDB loan and the reported third-party arrears fund remain proposals or unconfirmed reports, not approved funding.
What are the main legal and procedural obstacles?
- Authorisation to negotiate and settle. GL 58 permits preparation, not creditor negotiations. Separate OFAC authority is needed; no such debt authorisation is reported as of the latest 13 October briefing.
- An audited perimeter and DSA. USD 238bn gross is not USD 238bn owed to external creditors. Intra-public claims, interest and overlaps need reconciliation; IMF growth forecasts do not substitute for a sustainability analysis.
- Series-level creditor consent. All but about USD 1bn of Republic bonds have collective action clauses allowing 75 percent of each series to change payment terms. PDVSA bonds have no such clauses; simple-majority exit consents concern non-payment terms. An aggregate 37 percent holding establishes neither a veto nor an acceptance threshold in any particular series.
- CITGO and the secured 2020 bonds. The appeal abeyance is requested, not granted. The proposed sale and the 50.1 percent CITGO Holding pledge remain separate enforcement and licensing questions; GL 5Z's next date is 5 November.
- New-money priority. Clearing IDB arrears or lending against central-bank gold could create claims ahead of unsecured bonds. The proposed Gulf fund and gold transfer are unconfirmed; neither is cash already available for debt service.
- Signing capacity and institutional reform. US recognition does not resolve every domestic mandate question. The third political-dialogue round opens on 14 October, without an agreed presidential election date.
- Reachable oil revenue. The August agreement and field contracts remain unpublished. Projected royalties and taxes of more than USD 209bn over 25 years average about USD 8.4bn a year, before other public spending needs; gross export receipts are not freely available creditor cash.
Timeline of key events (2026)
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Jan 3 | US operation removes Nicolás Maduro; Delcy Rodríguez becomes acting president. Defaulted bonds begin a historic rally. |
| Jan 9 | US executive order routes Venezuelan oil revenue to a Treasury-managed escrow, shielded from creditor seizure. |
| Apr 13 | Chevron and Venezuela sign agreements to expand crude production. |
| May 5 | Article 234 constitutional ceiling passes without a National Assembly extension vote (Day 0 of constitutional silence). |
| May 13 | Government formally announces a comprehensive restructuring of sovereign and PDVSA debt (Day 0 of restructuring process). |
| Late May | Venezuela Creditor Committee (Fidelity, MSIM, Greylock) announces readiness to negotiate. |
| May (Day 0) | GL 58 (restructuring-services) issued; preparatory advisory work, not authority to negotiate or settle debt. |
| Jun 2 | Creditor adviser line: Orrick as counsel; Houlihan Lokey as financial adviser. |
| Jun 10 | OFAC amendment bundle (GLs 46C, 47A, 48B, 50B, 51B, 52A, 54A; FAQ 1260). |
| Jun 17 | Third Circuit grants two-month postponement of oral argument in the Stark sale appeal. |
| Jun 18 | GL 5X issued, delaying GL 5 effectiveness to August 4 (twenty-third consecutive CITGO collateral extension). |
| Jun 23 | Treasury issues sixty-day Iranian oil production/sale licence; GL 58 at Day 49 with zero execution licences. |
| Jun 24 | FT exclusive: Caracas to disclose ~USD 240bn debt perimeter; Centerview retained, Lazard's USD 25m approach rejected; DSA slips to early July. |
| Jun 24 | Earthquake strikes the central and western states; relief authorisation (GL 60) issues June 25, running to October. |
| Jun 30 | Hellerstein SDNY hearing, criminal track (S4 11 Cr. 205). |
| Jul 6 | The acting president's 180-day mandate expires without a National Assembly extension vote; the state declines to mark the date. |
| Jul (mid) | Macroeconomic framework and Centerview-prepared DSA both pass their revised deadline undelivered. |
| Aug 3 | GL 5Y issued, carrying the CITGO collateral shield with effectiveness deferred to September 17. |
| Aug 4 | The long-tracked collateral cliff arrives as a date, not an event. |
| Aug 5 | ONGC Videsh reported to receive a specific waiver for resumed Venezuela operations; India consolidates as a licensed buyer. |
| Aug 12-13 | First scheduled gate of the joint working agenda clears at Gran Melia Caracas with two procedural agreements. |
| Aug 19 | Treasury designates a shipping operator; the first Venezuela-facing action of the month is enforcement, not authorisation. |
| Aug 21 | GL 61 and GL 62 issued, extending the licensed perimeter to telecommunications. |
| Sep 2 | Perimeter still undisclosed; GL 58 at Day 120 with zero execution licences. Brent near USD 95. |
| Sep 7 | Concession package over seventeen fields with a stated sixty-five billion barrels enters the public record; Caracas describes twenty-five years renewable, the White House fact sheet hundred-year concessions. |
| Sep 14 | GL 52C issued, tightening the counterparty and signature conditions on new PDVSA contracts and joint ventures. |
| Sep 16 | GL 5Z issued, replacing GL 5Y in its entirety and moving the PDVSA 2020 bondholder effectiveness date from September 17 to November 5. No restructuring execution licence reported. |
| Sep 18 | FT reports a proposed transfer of 31 tonnes of central-bank gold from London to New York for possible collateral-backed borrowing; parties do not confirm it. |
| Sep 22-23 | President and interim president meet in New York; Rubio says debt restructuring was discussed. Reuters reports a proposed USD 2.5bn IDB loan, dependent on arrears clearance and waivers. |
| Sep 25 | Second political-dialogue cycle closes with institutional commitments, not a debt exchange or a gold-transfer agreement. |
| Sep 28 | OFAC reissues GL 46E, 48D and 49B, adding methanol to the petrochemical annex; no debt-negotiation authorisation. |
| Oct 1-2 | IMF says no financing requested and considers a technical presence; IDB reopens its Caracas office. |
| Oct 5 | Unofficial report of a Qatar/two-state fund to refinance about USD 2.5bn of IDB obligations; unconfirmed by the bank, Qatar or Caracas. |
| Oct 7 | El Nacional reports gross official debt near USD 238bn and an expected adviser reference document; Grisanti estimates about USD 40bn of intra-public-sector claims. |
| Oct 8 | Amber and several Delaware creditors oppose the CITGO appeal abeyance. Gold Reserve's support is conditional and limited to six months. |
| Oct 9 | Bloomberg reports GMO/T. Rowe Price among an ad hoc group holding at least USD 22bn, about 37 percent of bonds; advisers and series split not disclosed. |
| Oct 13 | US views on CITGO abeyance due; no filing reported at the latest briefing's Tuesday check. IMF October WEO projects 5 percent growth in 2026 and 7 percent in 2027. GL 58 at Day 161. |
| Oct 14 (scheduled) | Third political-dialogue round: Supreme Tribunal selection, electoral-council reform and recovery of London gold. |
| Oct 15-16 (scheduled) | Assembly calendar: eligible Judicial Nominations Committee candidates to plenary on Oct 15; committee sworn in Oct 16. |
| Oct 23 (next gate) | GL 60 earthquake-relief authorisation expires unless renewed or replaced. |
| Nov 5 (next gate) | GL 5Z deferred effectiveness date on the CITGO collateral. |
What we are watching next
- The United States' requested 13 October response on CITGO and the Third Circuit's decision on abeyance; neither outcome is assumed here.
- The adviser reference document and DSA: publication, recipients, gross-to-consolidated reconciliation and whether the IMF owns or only advises on the analysis.
- Any OFAC authority permitting actual debt negotiations, contingent agreements or settlement, rather than preparatory services alone.
- The ad hoc group's series-level holdings, adviser appointments and relationship to the Venezuela Creditor Committee.
- The third dialogue round from 14 October and any documented agreement on gold custody, collateral, immunity and creditor priority.
- IDB arrears clearance, board waivers and confirmation or rejection of the reported Gulf fund; no approved new lending is assumed.
- GL 60's 23 October expiry and GL 5Z's 5 November deferred effectiveness date.
- The publication of oil contracts and the state's net accessible revenues, alongside the IMF forecast's data caveats and external-financing assumptions.
- Supreme Tribunal appointments targeted for November, electoral-council reform targeted for December and an actual presidential election calendar; targets are not signed election commitments.
Frequently asked questions
Can US investors trade Venezuelan bonds?
Secondary trading of certain Venezuelan debt was permitted by OFAC guidance changes in 2023, but the sanctions framework remains restrictive, and participation in debt negotiations or settlement requires further applicable OFAC authorisation; GL 58 alone does not permit it. This is not legal advice; consult sanctions counsel.
When will negotiations actually start?
Preparatory work is under way, but no authorised creditor negotiation or exchange terms have been reported as of 13 October. The political dialogue is not a bondholder negotiating table. No firm exchange timetable has been announced.
Will the IMF be involved?
The October WEO projects growth of 5 percent in 2026 and 7 percent in 2027, with year-end 2026 inflation of 336.7 percent. These forecasts are not a Fund-owned DSA. The IMF is considering a technical presence and said on 1 October that no financing had been requested; the debtor's DSA remains unpublished.
What is GL 58 and why does the 'execution licence' matter?
GL 58 permits preparatory advisory services, not creditor negotiations. Separate OFAC authority is needed to negotiate and settle a debt transaction. No such debt authorisation is reported in the latest 13 October briefing, at Day 161.
What happens to the ICSID awards in a restructuring?
More than USD 20bn in arbitration and expropriation awards is included in indicative debt estimates, not an audited published perimeter. Delaware recovery routes may pay some award holders before an unsecured bond exchange, subject to the appeal and OFAC authorisation; overlaps must be reconciled.
What is the PDVSA 2020 bond dispute?
The PDVSA 2020s are secured by a pledge of 50.1 percent of CITGO Holding. The latest briefing puts the Amber sale provision for holders at USD 2.125bn. GL 5Z defers the collateral authorisation to 5 November; that is not an automatic CITGO sale closing date.
How big a haircut should creditors expect?
No haircut or exchange terms have been proposed. Recoveries depend on the reconciled debt perimeter, net accessible revenues, new-money priority, licensing and creditor consent. IMF growth forecasts alone cannot establish a sustainable debt-service envelope.
The Venezuela Restructuring Desk provides independent analysis of Venezuela's sovereign and PDVSA debt restructuring, tracking litigation, sanctions, oil production, and creditor developments from sources on the ground. This tracker is free and updated continuously.